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Abstract. An important challenge faced by the developers of fault-
tolerant distributed systems is to build fault tolerance mechanisms that
are reliable. To achieve the desired levels of reliability, the development
of mechanisms for detecting and handling errors should be rigorous or
formal. In this paper, we present an approach to modeling and verify-
ing fault-tolerant distributed systems that use exception handling as the
main fault tolerance mechanism. The proposed approach is based on a
formal model for specifying the structure of a system in terms of cooper-
ating participants that handle exceptions in a coordinated manner. We
use a medical control system as a case study to validate the proposed
approach.
1 Introduction
Applications that can cause risks for human lives or risk of great financial losses
are usually made fault tolerant [2], so that they are capable of providing their
intended service, even if only partially, when faults occur. Fault tolerant systems
include mechanisms for detecting errors in their states and recovering from these
errors. There are two main types of error recovery [2]: backward error recovery
(based on rolling the system back to the previous correct state) and forward
error recovery (which involves transforming the system into any correct state).
The former usually uses either diversely implemented software or simple retry;
the latter is typically application-specific and relies on an exception handling
mechanism [7].
Usually, a large part of the system code is devoted to error detection and
handling [7, 15]. However, since developers tend to focus on the normal activity
of applications and only deal with the code responsible for error detection and
handling at the implementation phase, this part of the code is usually the least
understood, tested, and documented [7]. In order to achieve the desired levels
of reliability, mechanisms for detecting and handling errors should be developed
systematically from the early phases of development [13]. Ideally, the construc-
tion of system fault tolerance mechanisms should follow a rigorous or formal
development methodology [3].
Error recovery in concurrent and distributed systems is known to be com-
plicated by various factors, such as high cost of reaching an agreement, absence
of a global view on the system state, multiple concurrent errors, difficulties in
ensuring error isolation, etc. These systems require special error recovery mecha-
nisms that suit their main characteristics. As it is not possible to develop general
error recovery mechanisms applicable for all types of concurrent and distributed
systems, two classes of techniques were developed to support recovery in com-
peting and cooperating concurrent and distributed systems [16]. Distributed
transactions [8] and atomic actions [5] are well-known examples of techniques
for structuring competing and cooperative fault-tolerant distributed systems,
respectively.
The Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions concept [16] results from combining
distributed transactions and atomic actions. Atomic actions are used to control
cooperative concurrency and to implement coordinated exception handling [5]
whilst distributed transactions are used to maintain the consistency of the re-
sources shared by competing actions. CA actions function as exception handling
contexts for cooperative systems and exceptions raised in an action are handled
cooperatively by all the action’s participants. If two or more exceptions are con-
currently raised, an exception resolution mechanism [5] is employed to find an
exception to be handled that represents all the exceptions raised concurrently (a
resolved exception). Many case studies [12, 17] have shown that CA actions are a
powerful and useful tool for structuring large, distributed fault-tolerant systems.
In order for CA actions to be applicable for the construction of complex,
real-world systems with strict dependability requirements, software development
based on CA actions has to be supported by rigorous models, techniques, and
tools. Several approaches have been proposed for formalizing the CA action con-
cept with the intention either to give a more complete and rigorous description
of the concept [14] or to verify systems designed using CA actions [17]. However,
an important aspect of CA actions that has not been addressed by existing work
is coordinated exception handling. This is surprising, since exception handling
complements other techniques for improving reliability, such as atomic transac-
tions, and promotes the implementation of specialized and sophisticated error
recovery measures. Moreover, in distributed applications where a rollback is not
possible, such as those that interact with the environment, exception handling
may be the only choice available.
Some authors [4] claim that mechanisms for involving multiple participants
in coordinated exception handling are difficult to both implement and use. How-
ever, we believe that programmers will make more mistakes in an ad hoc imple-
mentation of coordinated exception handling that in applying the well-defined
mechanisms that general frameworks such as CA actions provide. Therefore,
techniques and tools that mitigate the inherent complexity of coordinated ex-
ception handling and help developers in the specification and design of systems
that make use of this feature are required.
In this paper, we examine the problem of specifying CA action-based designs
in a way that allows us to verify automatically if these designs exhibit certain
properties of interest regarding coordinated exception handling. Moreover, since
coordinated exception handling is strongly related with action structuring, it is
also necessary to model how CA actions are nested and composed [12] to define
multiple exception handling contexts. We present an approach to modeling CA
action-based designs that makes it possible to verify these designs automatically
using a constraint solver. The main component of the proposed approach is a
formal model of CA actions that specifies the structuring of a system in terms of
actions, as well as information relative to exception flow amongst these actions.
This model can be directly specified using well-known specification languages,
like Alloy [10] and B [1], and verified automatically using the tool sets associated
with these languages. With the proposed approach, it is possible to check whether
a CA-action based design satisfies several properties of interest.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
CA actions and the Alloy design language. Section 3 presents an overview of
the proposed approach, including some of the properties that it helps verifying.
Section 4 presents a case study to illustrate the feasability and usefulness of the
proposed approach. The last section rounds the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Coordinated Atomic Actions
A CA action is designed as a set of roles cooperating inside it and a set of
resources accessed by them. An action starts when its roles are taken by partic-
ipants (e.g. processes, threads, active objects, etc.). In the course of the action,
participants can access resources that have ACID (atomicity, consistency, iso-
lation, durability) properties. Action participants either reach the end of the
action and produce a normal outcome or, if one or more exceptions are raised
within the action, they all are involved in coordinated handling. If handling is
successful the action completes by producing a normal outcome, but if handling
is not possible then all responsibility for recovery is passed to the containing
action where an external action exception is signaled.
The CA action scheme enforces a clear difference between internal exceptions
(which are raised in the action and have handlers inside the action) and exter-
nal exceptions, which are signaled outside the action when the action cannot
deliver the results. The latter is used to report partial action outcomes, abort
effect, failure to achieve a consistent result by action participants, etc. Inter-
nal exceptions are encapsulated in the action, whereas external ones are visible
in the action interface as they have to be dealt with by the containing action.
When several exceptions are concurrently raised in a CA action, an exception
resolution mechanism is used.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of a trivial system structured using
CA actions. Top-level CA action A1 has three roles performed by participants P1,
P2, and P3. Participants P2 and P3 also perform roles R4 and R5, respectively, in
the nested CA action A2. Role R5 of A2 spawns composed CA action A3 at some
point in time after the completion of A2. R5 is interrupted from the moment A3
starts until it completes. The internal exceptions of an action are represented by
small squares (labeled E1, E2, E3, and E4 in the figure). Each exception is placed
near the role that raises it.
Fig. 1. A CA action example.
The choice of fault tolerance error recovery approach to be exploited for the
development of dependable systems depends very much on the fault assumptions
and on the system characteristics and requirements. In spite of all its advan-
tages, backward error recovery has a limited applicability. Modern systems are
increasingly relying on forward error recovery which uses appropriate exception
handling techniques as the chief technique [7]. Examples of such applications are
complex systems involving human beings, COTS components, external devices,
several organizations, movement of goods, operations on the environment, real-
time systems that do not have time to go back. Service-oriented architectures
fall also clearly into this category. The CA actions provide a valuable conceptual
tool for architecting these systems.
2.2 Alloy Design Language
Alloy [10] is a lightweight modeling language for software design. It is amenable
to a fully automatic analysis, using the Alloy Analyzer (AA), and provides a vi-
sualizer for making sense of solutions and counterexamples it finds. Alloy is based
on first-order relational logic and, similarly to other specification languages, such
as Z, Alloy supports complex data structures and declarative models. In this
work, we use Alloy to formally specify CA action-based designs.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size (the maximum
number of instances of a type). The analysis performed by the AA is sound,
since it never returns false positives, but incomplete, since the AA only checks
things up to a certain scope. However, it is complete up to scope; the AA never
misses a counterexample which is smaller than the specified scope.
3 Proposed Approach
The construction of robust fault-tolerant systems requires that developers take
fault tolerance-related issues into account since the early phases of development.
Our ultimate goal is to devise a general approach for the rigorous development
of dependable distributed systems that use both cooperative and competitive
concurrency.
This work addresses specifically the issue of verifying properties of interest
related to system structuring and coordinated exception handling in CA action-
based designs. The following sections present an overview of the proposed ap-
proach (Section 3.1) and briefly describe some of the properties that can be
verified using this approach (Section 3.2).
3.1 Overview
Figure 2 presents a schematic description of the proposed approach for verifying
CA action-based designs. Developers start by performing traditional activities of
a software development process, namely, analysis and architectural design of the
system, assuming that the system is concurrent and cooperative. At the same
time, they define the scenarios in which the system may fail (fault model), what
exceptions correspond to each type of error, and where and how the exceptions
are handled (exceptional activity). The specification of the system’s fault model
and exceptional activity can be conducted as prescribed by some works in the
literature [13]. The result of these activities is a CA action-based design of the
system that includes a description of the exceptions that can be raised in each CA
action and how they are handled. This design is usually described in a modeling
language for CA actions (or simply modeling language), for example, informal
diagrams (as presented in Section 2.1), the Coala [14] formal language, or the
FTT-UML [9] profile for the UML.
To verify the CA action-based design, it is necessary to translate it to a
formal language with adequate support for automated verification (verification
language). Examples of such languages are Alloy and B. If the modeling language
has a well-defined semantics, like Coala, this translation can be completely auto-
mated by a tool. The translation can also be automated for informal notations,
like UML profiles, but only partially. Usually, some manual intervention is re-
quired to resolve ambiguities. Developers used to formal methods can write the
system descriptions directly in the verification language. The choice of using one
or two specification languages is based solely on usability issues.
The formal specification produced by translating the CA action-based design
to the verification language must adhere to a generic formal model that specifies
the elements of CA actions and how they relate (hereafter called generic CA
actions model). The elements of the generic CA actions model are Action, Role,
Participant, and RootException. They are the main concepts used in the definition
of CA actions. Some of them, like Action and Role, include additional informa-
tion represented through relations. For example, the set of roles of an action is
defined by the Roles ∈ Action↔Role relation. Both the formal specification and
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed approach. White rectangles represent activities and
shaded rectangles with dashed borders represent artifacts.
the generic CA actions model are described in the verification language. Up to
now, we specified generic CA actions models using B and Alloy as verification
languages. These models are presented in the appendixes.
A system is verified by providing its formal specification as input to a con-
straint solver for the verification language, together with the properties to be
verified. We used the AA and ProB [11] constraint solvers to verify formal speci-
fications in Alloy and B, respectively. If any of the properties of interest does not
hold, the constraint solver produces a counterexample. Both constraint solvers,
besides generating a counterexample, include a graphic visualizer that provides
additional help in the identification of the problem.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the last two activities of Figure 2, the
ones directly related to system verification.
3.2 Properties of Interest
The properties of interest that a system must satisfy are split in three categories:
basic, desired, and application-specific. Basic properties define the characteristics
of valid CA actions. They specify the coordinated exception handling mechanism
and how actions are organized. Examples of basic properties are presented be-
low, stated informally.
BP1. If a participant performs a role in a nested action, it must also perform
some role in the containing action.
BP2. No cycles in action nesting.
BP3. The exception resolution mechanism of an action resolves all possible com-
binations of concurrent internal exceptions, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Desired properties are general properties that are usually considered benefi-
cial, although they are not part of the basic mechanism of CA actions. In general,
they assume that the basic properties hold. Some examples are the following.
DP1. Top-level CA actions have no external exceptions.
DP2. All internal exceptions of an action are handled in it.
DP3. All roles of an action have handlers for all of its internal exceptions, in-
cluding all resolved ones.
Application-specific properties are self-explanatory. The generic CA actions
models we have specified so far include the specifications of several basic and
desired properties that can be used “as-is”. Developers only specify additional
desired properties and application-specific properties, if any.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, properties of interest are specified in the verifica-
tion language. The following snippet presents a formal specification for property
BP1 in Alloy.
predicate parts_ok() { (all A:Action| (all NA:A.NestedActions|
all NAR:NA.Roles| !(all P:Participant|!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed
&& some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles)))))
}
This snippet defines an Alloy predicate named parts ok. Alloy predicates
are logic sentences that must be checked by the AA. In the body of the predi-
cate, Roles, NestedActions, and RolesPlayed are names of some relations that
associate information to the elements of the system (actions, participants, etc.)
and the “.” operator is a generalized form of relational composition. For exam-
ple, A.NestedActions yields the set of actions nested within action A, assuming
that A ∈ Action, where Action is a type (a set or, more generally, unary rela-
tion), and NestedActions ∈ Action↔Action is a relation. Predicate parts ok
states that every role of every nested action is performed by some participant
that also performs some role in the enclosing action. The operators all, some,
!, &&, and & represent, respectively, universal quantifier, existential quantifier,
logical negation, logical conjunction, and set intersection.
The following snippet shows a formal specification in Alloy for property DP1.
It states that all actions that are not nested within some other action and not
composed by some role have no external exceptions.
all A1:Action | ((no A2:Action | A1 in A2.NestedActions)
&& (no R:Role | A1 in R.ComposedActions)) => (no A1.External)
4 Case Study
The Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy [6] (FTIPT) is a control system with
strict reliability requirements for treating patients with diabetes. This system
is based on the Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Injection technique [6] and
involves several sensors and actuators that must function concurrently and con-
tinuously. These sensors and actuators are wearable devices put on by patients
under treatment. The dose of insulin administered by the system includes two
types of insulin: rapid action insulin (RAI) and long action insulin (LAI).
Sensors and actuators exchange information by means of wireless communi-
cation channels. Sensors send information about the vital signs of a patient to
a server located in a hospital. The latter forwards this information to a doctor
who defines the amount of insulin to inject. The server then communicates with
the actuators which use pumps to administer the established dose of insulin.
Both sensors and actuators may fail. Sensors can fail by stopping to send
information about a patient’s vital signs. However, when they do send informa-
tion, the latter is assumed to be correct. Actuators can also fail in the same
manner. Moreover, they may fail because there is not enough insulin to apply
the required dose. Whenever an error is detected, treatment is interrupted and
an alarm located in a remote emergency room is activated. We assume that the
wireless channels do not fail.
4.1 CA Action-Based Design
In another work [6], CA actions were used to design and implement the FTIPT.
The system is organized as a set of actions that structure the execution of sensors
and actuators. Coordinated exception handling is used as the main fault toler-
ance mechanism, since it is not possible to roll back when insulin is administered
to a patient.
Figure 3 shows the informal design of the system. For simplicity, it does
not depict accesses to shared resources or interactions between participants. CA
action CAA Cycle controls the overall execution of the system and determines
the amount of insulin that must be injected for each pump based on the pa-
tient’s vital signs. Actions CAA Sensors and CAA Actuators are spawned by roles
ControllerChecking and ControllerExecuting of actions CAA Checking and CAA Ex-
ecuting, respectively. They are responsible, respectively, for collecting the vital
signs of the patient and administering the insulin. Each of these composed CA
actions has three roles. The roles A RAIP and A LAIP of CAA Actuators spawn
the composed CA actions CAA RAIP and CAA LAIP, respectively. The latter two
control the two pumps that will administer the two types of insulin.
Seven different types of exceptions can be raised in the system (Table 1).
For most of these errors, exception handling consists in stopping the treatment
and activating the alarm in the emergency room. In some cases, such as when
the value of a sensor cannot be obtained, the handler will try again once before
giving up.
4.2 Applying the Proposed Approach
The CA action-based design described in the previous section was modeled in
Alloy and B. Hereafter, due to space constraints, we focus on the Alloy version.
Fig. 3. CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy.
Exc. Description
E1 Heart Rate (HR) sensor does not respond.
E2 Blood Glucose (BGC) sensor does not respond.
E3 Delivery limit reached.
E4 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) does not respond.
E5 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) stops during delivery.
E6 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) does not respond.
E7 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) stops during delivery.
Table 1. Exceptions in the CA action-based design.
The specification of the system in both languages is available in the appendixes.
The following snippet shows part of the Alloy specification of the system.
// Imports generic CA actions model
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
// CA actions extend ‘‘Action’’.
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAASensors,
CAAExecuting extends Action{}
// Roles extend ‘‘Role’’.
one sig ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking,
S_CT, BGC, HR extends Role {}
// Exceptions extend ‘‘RootException’’.
one sig E1, E2, E3 extends RootException {}
// Participants extend ‘‘Participant’’.
one sig P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 extends Participant {}
... // Other declarations.
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking + CAAExecuting
CAACycle.Roles = ControllerCycle + ParamsCycle + Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ControllerChecking + ParamsChecking
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
ControllerChecking.ComposedActions = CAASensors
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
P1.RolesPlayed = ControllerCycle + ControllerChecking
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionFlow {
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2 && BGC.Generates = E1 &&
BGC.Raises = E1 && HR.Raises = E2 && HR.Generates = E2
...// Other definitions. }
In Alloy, a signature (sig keyword) specifies a type. The one keyword in-
dicates that a signature has exactly one instance. We use signatures for mod-
eling actions, roles, participants, and exceptions. Additional information is as-
sociated to these elements by means of relations. These relations are explicitly
instantiated by facts, predicates that the AA must assume to be true when
evaluating constraints. For instance, the fact SystemStructure in the snip-
pet above states, among other things, that CA action CAAChecking has two
roles, ControllerChecking and ParamsChecking, and no nested actions. It
also states that participant P1 performs the roles ControllerChecking and
ControllerCycle of actions CAAChecking and CAACycle, respectively. More-
over, the fact ExceptionFlow states, among other things, that roles BGC and
HR raise exceptions E1 and E2, and that the latter are internal exceptions of
CA action CAASensors. The open clause in the beginning of the specification
imports the definitions of the basic types of the proposed model, Action, Role,
Participant, and RootException. Moreover, it imports the predicates that
specify the basic properties of CA actions and some predefined desired proper-
ties.
Let us now discuss some positive experience we had while developing the
formal specification of the FTIPT case study. This work helped us in identifying
a number of shortcomings in the original informal description of the system.
According to the original system description, the handlers for exceptions E4
and E6 “must stop the delivery of insulin and ring the danger alarm”. Just by
reading this statement, though, it is not possible to know the CA action that
will be responsible for ringing the alarm when one of these exceptions is raised.
Even though we are not explicitly modeling the actual alarm, this information
is still relevant. If the alarm is to be activated by a CA action other than the
one where the exception was raised, an exception should be propagated from
the CA action where the error was detected to the one that will ring the alarm.
However, no such exception exists in the original design of the system.
For simplicity, we could assume that some role in the CA action where an
exception is raised is responsible for ringing the alarm. However, this is not the
best option since it scatters the responsibility of activating the alarm throughout
the whole application, partially defeating the purpose of decomposing the system
into actions. In the end, we decided to add a new exception named AlarmEXC
to the system specification. This exception is signaled by actions CAASensors,
CAARAIP, and CAALAIP and propagated all the way up to CAACycle, where it
is handled. Later, discussing the matter with the authors of the original case
study, we discovered that, to our surprise, that was actually what they meant. To
explicitly capture the idea that AlarmEXC can only be handled by CAACycle, we
specified this constraint as the following application-specific property. Assuming
the basic properties hold, it states that, for any action other than CAACycle, if
AlarmEXC is an internal exception, it is also external. Moreover, it states that
CAACycle handles AlarmEXC.
(AlarmEXC in CAACycle.Handles) && (all A:(Action - CAACycle)
| AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External)
After finishing the specification of the system in Alloy, we tried to verify the
basic CA action properties using the AA. In a couple of minutes, the latter pre-
sented a counterexample indicating that the specification failed to satisfy some
property of interest. Careful study of the counterexample revealed that prop-
erty BP3 of Section 3.2 was being violated. This problem happened because the
case where exceptions E1 and E2 are raised concurrently in action CAASensors
was not covered by the exception resolution mechanism of the action. To fix the
specification, we extended the action’s resolution mechanism so that, when these
two exceptions are raised concurrently, they are resolved to AlarmEXC. However,
discussing this problem with the authors of the original case study we found
out that these two exceptions are actually never raised concurrently. Hence, we
modified the Alloy specification to say explicitly that E1 and E2 are never raised
concurrently in CA action CAASensors.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented an approach for specifying and verifying cooperative
concurrent systems that use coordinated exception handling to achieve fault
tolerance. The usefulness of the proposed approach was demonstrated by a case
study. Even for a very simple application, the proposed approach helped us to
uncover some implicit assumptions in the original, informal design of the system.
The problems we found were directly related to the use of coordinated exception
handling. In other formal models for specifying CA actions, it would be harder
to spot problems like the ones we found because they focus on different aspects
of CA action-based systems, such as temporal ordering of events [17].
This work does not address some important aspects of systems structured as
CA actions. For example, it is not possible to model consistent access to external
resources or the dynamic structure of nested actions. In the near future, we
intend to expand the system model used in our approach to address these issues
and provide a more comprehensive framework for verifying CA action-based
systems.
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Appendix 1
Generic CA Actions Model in Alloy
module CoordinatedExceptionHandling
abstract sig RootException {}
abstract sig Keys {}
abstract sig Role {
Signals : set RootException,
Raises : set RootException,
GeneratesSignaling : set RootException,
GeneratesRaising : set RootException,
Resolved : set RootException,
// Encountered exceptions are assumed to be raised and never
// signaled. On the one hand, this simplifies the semantics
// of the model for cases where one wants to specify that an
// encountered exception is directly signaled (without being
// raised or resolved or propagated or anything). Moreover,
// allowing encountered exceptions to be signaled requires
// recursive definitions for Raises and Signals in order to
// avoid ambiguity. On the other hand, designers have to be
// slightly more explicit when specifying CA actions and roles
// (because the encountered exception has to be raised, resolved
// and, only then, signaled).
Encounters : set RootException,
// Two views on action-oriented exception handling: (i) only
// actions are contexts; and (ii) both actions and roles may be
// contexts. We support the second, but its easy to support the
// first as well. No modifications to the model are required.
Handles : set RootException,
ComponentActions : set Action,
Propagates : RootException->RootException,
Aborts : set RootException
}
abstract sig Action {
Internal : set RootException,
// Alloy can not express a relation of the type
// (set RootException)->RootException. The problem with this is
// that we have to use RootException->RootException relations,
// which are not adequate. For example, let E1, E2, and E3 be
// exceptions. If E1 is raised in isolation and resolved to E1
// and (E1 + E2) raised concurrently are resolved to E3, this
// can not be expressed.
ToResolve : RootException->Keys,
ResolvedTo : Keys->RootException,
// Sets of exceptions that do not need to be resolved because
// the developer knows that the exceptions in each set will never
// be raised concurrently.
Excluding : RootException->Keys,
External : set RootException,
Roles : set Role,
NestedActions : set Action,
// The exceptions to be signaled when the action aborts or fails,
// respectively.
AbortException : lone RootException,
FailException : lone RootException
}
abstract sig Participant {
// The roles the participant plays.
RolesPlayed : set Role
}
pred action_consistent(A : Action) {
A.Internal = A.Roles.Raises + A.NestedActions.External
A.External = A.Roles.Signals + A.AbortException + A.FailException
(A.ResolvedTo) :> (A.Roles.Resolved) = A.ResolvedTo
(let RES = (A.Internal).((A.ToResolve).(A.ResolvedTo)) |
(let Aborted = {E:RES | all R:A.Roles | E in R.Aborts } |
(#Aborted > 0 => (some A.AbortException))
&& (#Aborted = 0 => no A.AbortException)
)
&&
// If the action signals at least two different exceptions and
// the action does not abort nor handle all of its resolved
// exceptions, then it may fail. A.Roles.Signal is used,
// instead of A.External, in order to cover the case where
// A.FailException is in A.External, because we do not want to
// take into account A.FailException, unless it is one of the
// exceptions signaled by the roles (independently of being
// A.FailException).
(#(RES - { E: RES | all R:A.Roles |
E in R.Handles || E in R.Aborts}) > 0 =>
( (#(A.Roles.Signals + A.FailException) > 1 =>
some A.FailException)
&&
(#A.Roles.Signals =< 1 => no A.FailException)
)
)
)
(all K_E:Keys | #(A.Excluding).K_E > 0 => (no K_TR:Keys |
(A.ToResolve).K_TR = (A.Excluding).K_E))
// Exception raising is consistent.
all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A, A.ToResolve)
// Groups of exceptions that can be raised concurrently but
// should not be taken into account by resolution are also
// consistent.
all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A, A.Excluding)
participants_consistent(A)
// Requires high-order quantification.
/* (all ES : some (A.Internal) |
concurrent_raising_consistent(A, ES) => !(all K : Keys |
(A.ToResolve).K != ES && (A.Excluding).K != ES)
)
*/
}
pred participants_consistent(A:Action) {
// Consistency of nested actions. All the roles in a nested
// action are played by participants who also play some role
// in the enclosing action.
(all NA : A.NestedActions | all NAR : NA.Roles |
!(all P : Participant |
!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed && some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles))))
// All roles of action A are associated to some participant
(Participant.RolesPlayed & A.Roles) = A.Roles
// No Participant can play two roles in the same action.
(no P : Participant | #(P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles) > 1)
}
pred all_keys_conc_raising_consistent(A:Action,
ExcMap:RootException->Keys){
(all K:Keys | let ES = ExcMap.K |
concurrent_raising_consistent(A, ES))
}
// Auxiliary predicate. Checks whether, for a set of exceptions
// ES in the domain of A.ToResolve, each exception E in ES was
// (could have been) raised by a different participant.
pred concurrent_raising_consistent(A:Action, ES:set RootException) {
#ES =< #{R:A.Roles | #(R.Raises & ES) > 0}
+ #{NAA:A.NestedActions | #(NAA.External & ES) > 0} }
pred actions_consistent() {
all A:Action | action_consistent(A)
}
assert ActionsConsistent {
actions_consistent()
}
pred role_consistent(R:Role, A:Action) {
R.Encounters = R.ComponentActions.External
R.Resolved = Keys.(A.ResolvedTo)
no (R.Handles & R.Aborts)
R.Aborts in R.Resolved
thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R, R.Signals,
R.GeneratesSignaling, R.Resolved)
// role_is_context(R)
role_is_not_context(R)
}
// Consistency checks for EHS where roles ARE exception
// handling contexts.
pred role_is_context(R:Role) {
// Computes the Raises set of a role for EHS where both roles
// and actions are EH contexts.
thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R, R.Raises, R.GeneratesRaising,
R.Encounters)
(R.Encounters + R.Resolved - R.Handles) <:
(R.Propagates) = R.Propagates
(R.Propagates) :> (R.Signals + R.Raises) = R.Propagates
R.Handles in (R.Resolved + R.Encounters)
}
// Consistency checks for EHS where roles ARE NOT exception
// handling contexts.
pred role_is_not_context(R:Role) {
// Computes the Raises set of a role for EHS where only actions
// are EH contexts (therefore, encountered exceptions can not be
// handled or explicitly propagated).
R.Raises = R.Encounters + R.GeneratesRaising
(R.Resolved - R.Handles) <: (R.Propagates) = R.Propagates
(R.Propagates) :> (R.Signals) = R.Propagates
R.Handles in R.Resolved
}
// This predicate checks whether a set of thrown exceptions is
// consistent. "Thrown" means either signaled or raised.
// "Generated" is the set of exceptions that are generated by
// role "R". "Received" means either "Encountered" or "Resolved",
// depending on the meaning of "Thrown".
pred thrown_exceptions_set_consistent(R:Role,
Thrown:set RootException, Generated:set RootException,
Received:set RootException) {
(let RealRes = (Received - R.Handles) | Thrown = Generated
+((RealRes - {E:RealRes|some E.(R.Propagates)})
+ RealRes.(R.Propagates)))
}
pred roles_consistent() {
all A:Action | all R:A.Roles | role_consistent(R, A)
}
assert RolesConsistent {
roles_consistent()
}
// Desired property -> No top-level (non-nested, non-component)
// CA action has external exceptions. This is not a fundamental
// property of CA actions, but a desirable property that indicates
// a safe use of CA actions.
pred top_level_actions_safe() {
all A1:Action | ((no A2:Action | A1 in A2.NestedActions)
&& (no R:Role | A1 in R.ComponentActions)) => (no A1.External)
}
assert TopLevelActionsSafe {
top_level_actions_safe()
}
// Desired property -> No internal exception of a CA action is
// visible to the outside world. "Internal", in this case,
// includes the action’s Internal set and the Resolved sets of
// its roles. All internal exceptions are either handled (and
// normal activity is resumed) or propagated to something else.
// It must be stressed that this predicate does not impose any
// restrictions on an the external exceptions of an action.
pred internal_exceptions_not_visible_outside() {
all A:Action | no (A.External & A.Internal) &&
no (A.External & A.Roles.Resolved)
}
assert InternalExceptionsNotVisibleOutside {
internal_exceptions_not_visible_outside()
}
// Basic-property -> No action nesting/composition cycles. This
// property must take into account situations where action and
// composition are combined. It is not enough to just verify if the
// action A is in the (non-reflexive) transitive closure of
// A.NestedActions and A.Roles.ComponentActions (a top-down
// approach). The check must be performed bottom-up.
pred no_action_nesting_cycles() {
no A:Action| A in A.^(~(Roles.ComponentActions + NestedActions))
}
assert NoActionNestingCycles {
no_action_nesting_cycles()
}
pred basic_properties() {
all A:Action | action_consistent(A) && all R:A.Roles |
role_consistent(R, A)
}
assert BasicProperties {
basic_properties()
}
Appendix 2
Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy in Alloy
module FTIPT
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
// ACTIONS
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAAExecuting extends Action {}
one sig CAASensors extends Action {}
one sig CAAActuators extends Action {}
one sig CAARAIP, CAALAIP extends Action {}
// ROLES
one sig ParamsCAACycle, ParamsCAAChecking, ParamsCAAExecuting
extends Role {}
one sig ControllerCAACycle, ControllerCAAChecking,
ControllerCAAExecuting extends Role {}
one sig Calculus extends Role {}
one sig S_CT, BGC, HR extends Role {}
one sig A_CT, A_RAIP, A_LAIP extends Role {}
one sig RAIP, SensorRAIP extends Role {}
one sig LAIP, SensorLAIP extends Role {}
one sig K1, K2, K3 extends Keys {}
one sig Params_Part, Controller_Part, Calculus_Part
extends Participant {}
one sig S_CT_Part, BGC_Part, HR_Part extends Participant {}
one sig A_CT_Part, A_RAIP_Part, A_LAIP_PArt extends Participant {}
one sig RAIP_Part, SensorRAIP_Part extends Participant {}
one sig LAIP_Part, SensorLAIP_Part extends Participant {}
// EXCEPTIONS
one sig E1, E2, E3, AlarmEXC extends RootException {}
one sig E4, E5, E6, E7 extends RootException {}
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.Roles = ParamsCAACycle + ControllerCAACycle + Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ParamsCAAChecking + ControllerCAAChecking
CAAExecuting.Roles = ParamsCAAExecuting + ControllerCAAExecuting
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking + CAAExecuting
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
no CAAExecuting.NestedActions
no CAASensors.NestedActions
Params_Part.RolesPlayed = ParamsCAAExecuting + ParamsCAAChecking
+ ParamsCAACycle
Controller_Part.RolesPlayed = ControllerCAACycle
+ ControllerCAAChecking + ControllerCAAExecuting
Calculus_Part.RolesPlayed = Calculus
S_CT_Part.RolesPlayed = S_CT
BGC_Part.RolesPlayed = BGC
HR_Part.RolesPlayed = HR
A_CT_Part.RolesPlayed = A_CT
A_RAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = A_RAIP
A_LAIP_PArt.RolesPlayed = A_LAIP
RAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = RAIP
SensorRAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = SensorRAIP
LAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = LAIP
SensorLAIP_Part.RolesPlayed = SensorLAIP
CAAActuators.Roles = A_CT + A_RAIP + A_LAIP
CAARAIP.Roles = RAIP + SensorRAIP
CAALAIP.Roles = LAIP + SensorLAIP
no CAAActuators.NestedActions
no CAARAIP.NestedActions
no CAALAIP.NestedActions
ControllerCAAChecking.ComponentActions = CAASensors
ControllerCAAExecuting.ComponentActions = CAAActuators
no ControllerCAACycle.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAACycle.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAAExecuting.ComponentActions
no ParamsCAAChecking.ComponentActions
no Calculus.ComponentActions
no S_CT.ComponentActions
no BGC.ComponentActions
no HR.ComponentActions
no A_CT.ComponentActions
A_RAIP.ComponentActions = CAARAIP
A_LAIP.ComponentActions = CAALAIP
no RAIP.ComponentActions
no LAIP.ComponentActions
no SensorLAIP.ComponentActions
no SensorRAIP.ComponentActions
}
fact ExceptionFlow {
no CAACycle.External
CAACycle.Internal = E3 + AlarmEXC
CAACycle.ToResolve = E3->K1 + AlarmEXC->K2 + (AlarmEXC + E3)->K3
CAACycle.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC + K3->AlarmEXC
no CAACycle.AbortException
no CAACycle.FailException
no CAACycle.Excluding
CAAChecking.External = AlarmEXC
CAAChecking.Internal = AlarmEXC
CAAChecking.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAChecking.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAChecking.AbortException
no CAAChecking.FailException
no CAAChecking.Excluding
CAAExecuting.External = AlarmEXC
CAAExecuting.Internal = AlarmEXC
CAAExecuting.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAExecuting.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAExecuting.AbortException
no CAAExecuting.FailException
no CAAExecuting.Excluding
CAASensors.External = AlarmEXC
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2
CAASensors.ToResolve = E1->K1 + E2->K2 + (E1 + E2)->K3
CAASensors.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC + K3->AlarmEXC
no CAASensors.AbortException
no CAASensors.FailException
no CAASensors.Excluding
CAAActuators.External = AlarmEXC
CAAActuators.Internal = AlarmEXC
CAAActuators.ToResolve = AlarmEXC->K1
CAAActuators.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC
no CAAActuators.AbortException
no CAAActuators.FailException
no CAAActuators.Excluding
CAARAIP.External = AlarmEXC
CAARAIP.Internal = E4 + E5
CAARAIP.ToResolve = E4->K1 + E5->K2
CAARAIP.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
no CAARAIP.AbortException
no CAARAIP.FailException
no CAARAIP.Excluding
CAALAIP.External = AlarmEXC
CAALAIP.Internal = E6 + E7
CAALAIP.ToResolve = E6->K1 + E7->K2
CAALAIP.ResolvedTo = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
no CAALAIP.AbortException
no CAALAIP.FailException
no CAALAIP.Excluding
no Calculus.Signals
Calculus.Raises = E3
Calculus.GeneratesRaising = E3
no Calculus.GeneratesSignaling
Calculus.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no Calculus.Encounters
Calculus.Handles = AlarmEXC
no Calculus.Propagates
no Calculus.Aborts
no ControllerCAACycle.Signals
no ControllerCAACycle.Raises
no ControllerCAACycle.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAACycle.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAACycle.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAACycle.Encounters
ControllerCAACycle.Handles = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAACycle.Propagates
no ControllerCAACycle.Aborts
no ParamsCAACycle.Signals
no ParamsCAACycle.Raises
no ParamsCAACycle.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAACycle.GeneratesSignaling
ParamsCAACycle.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAACycle.Encounters
ParamsCAACycle.Handles = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAACycle.Propagates
no ParamsCAACycle.Aborts
ControllerCAAChecking.Signals = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAChecking.Raises = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAChecking.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAAChecking.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAAChecking.Resolved = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAChecking.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAChecking.Handles
no ControllerCAAChecking.Propagates
no ControllerCAAChecking.Aborts
ParamsCAAChecking.Signals = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAChecking.Raises
no ParamsCAAChecking.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAAChecking.GeneratesSignaling
ParamsCAAChecking.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAChecking.Encounters
no ParamsCAAChecking.Handles
no ParamsCAAChecking.Propagates
no ParamsCAAChecking.Aborts
ControllerCAAExecuting.Signals = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAExecuting.Raises = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAExecuting.GeneratesRaising
no ControllerCAAExecuting.GeneratesSignaling
ControllerCAAExecuting.Resolved = AlarmEXC
ControllerCAAExecuting.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Handles
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Propagates
no ControllerCAAExecuting.Aborts
ParamsCAAExecuting.Signals = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Raises
no ParamsCAAExecuting.GeneratesRaising
no ParamsCAAExecuting.GeneratesSignaling
ParamsCAAExecuting.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Encounters
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Handles
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Propagates
no ParamsCAAExecuting.Aborts
S_CT.Signals = AlarmEXC
no S_CT.Raises
no S_CT.GeneratesRaising
no S_CT.GeneratesSignaling
S_CT.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no S_CT.Encounters
no S_CT.Handles
no S_CT.Propagates
no S_CT.Aborts
BGC.Signals = AlarmEXC
BGC.Raises = E1
BGC.GeneratesRaising = E1
no BGC.GeneratesSignaling
BGC.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no BGC.Encounters
no BGC.Handles
no BGC.Propagates
no BGC.Aborts
HR.Signals = AlarmEXC
HR.Raises = E2
HR.GeneratesRaising = E2
no HR.GeneratesSignaling
HR.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no HR.Encounters
no HR.Handles
no HR.Propagates
no HR.Aborts
A_CT.Signals = AlarmEXC
no A_CT.Raises
no A_CT.GeneratesRaising
no A_CT.GeneratesSignaling
A_CT.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no A_CT.Encounters
no A_CT.Handles
no A_CT.Propagates
no A_CT.Aborts
A_RAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
A_RAIP.Raises = AlarmEXC
no A_RAIP.GeneratesRaising
no A_RAIP.GeneratesSignaling
A_RAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
A_RAIP.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no A_RAIP.Handles
no A_RAIP.Propagates
no A_RAIP.Aborts
A_LAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
A_LAIP.Raises = AlarmEXC
no A_LAIP.GeneratesRaising
no A_LAIP.GeneratesSignaling
A_LAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
A_LAIP.Encounters = AlarmEXC
no A_LAIP.Handles
no A_LAIP.Propagates
no A_LAIP.Aborts
RAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
no RAIP.Raises
no RAIP.GeneratesRaising
no RAIP.GeneratesSignaling
RAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no RAIP.Encounters
no RAIP.Handles
no RAIP.Propagates
no RAIP.Aborts
SensorRAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
SensorRAIP.Raises = E4 + E5
SensorRAIP.GeneratesRaising = E4 + E5
no SensorRAIP.GeneratesSignaling
SensorRAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no SensorRAIP.Encounters
no SensorRAIP.Handles
no SensorRAIP.Propagates
no SensorRAIP.Aborts
LAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
no LAIP.Raises
no LAIP.GeneratesRaising
no LAIP.GeneratesSignaling
LAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no LAIP.Encounters
no LAIP.Handles
no LAIP.Propagates
no LAIP.Aborts
SensorLAIP.Signals = AlarmEXC
SensorLAIP.Raises = E6 + E7
SensorLAIP.GeneratesRaising = E6 + E7
no SensorLAIP.GeneratesSignaling
SensorLAIP.Resolved = AlarmEXC
no SensorLAIP.Encounters
no SensorLAIP.Handles
no SensorLAIP.Propagates
no SensorLAIP.Aborts
}
// Application-specific property. For all the actions except for
// the top-level CA action CAACycle, if AlarmEXC is an internall
// exception, it is also one external exception.
pred app_specific_properties() {
all A: (Action - CAACycle) |
AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External
}
assert AppSpecificProperties {
app_specific_properties()
}
Appendix 3
Partial Specifications of Generic CA Actions Model and
Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy in B
MACHINE CoordinatedExceptionHandling
/*
Static B machine for Coordinated Exception Handling.
*/
SETS ACTION = {CAACycle, CAAChecking};
PARTICIPANT = {P1, P2, P3};
ROLE = {Calculus, Controller, Params,
ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking};
ROOT_EXCEPTION = {E3, E4}; OK = {yes, no}
/* Variables of Action */
VARIABLES Internal, External, Roles, NestedActions,
AbortException, FailException, Resolution,
Excluding,
/* Variables of Role */
Signals, Raises, Generates, Resolved, Encounters,
Handles, ComponentActions, Propagates, Aborts,
/* Variables of Participant */
RolesPlayed,
/* Results of operations */
ActionsConsistent, ParticipantsConsistent,
RolesConsistent
INVARIANT Roles : ACTION <-> ROLE
& Internal : ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& External : ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& NestedActions : ACTION <-> ACTION
& AbortException : ACTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& FailException : ACTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolution : ACTION <-> (POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
+-> ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& Excluding : ACTION <-> POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& card(AbortException) <= 1 & card(FailException) <= 1
& Signals : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Raises : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Generates : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolved : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Encounters : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Handles : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Aborts : ROLE <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& ComponentActions : ROLE <-> ACTION
& Propagates : ROLE <->
(ROOT_EXCEPTION +-> ROOT_EXCEPTION)
& RolesPlayed : PARTICIPANT <-> ROLE
& ActionsConsistent : OK
& ActionsConsistent = yes
& ParticipantsConsistent : OK
& ParticipantsConsistent = yes
& RolesConsistent : OK
& RolesConsistent = yes
INITIALISATION Roles := { CAACycle |-> Calculus,
CAACycle |-> Controller, CAACycle |-> Params,
CAAChecking |-> ControllerChecking,
CAAChecking |-> ParamsChecking}
|| External := {} || Internal := { CAACycle |-> E3}
|| NestedActions := { CAACycle |-> CAAChecking}
|| AbortException := {}
|| FailException := {}
|| Resolution := {CAACycle |-> {{E3} |-> E3}}
|| Signals := {} || Excluding := {}
|| Raises := {Calculus |-> E3}
|| Generates := {Calculus |-> E3}
|| Resolved := {Calculus |-> E3, Controller |-> E3,
Params |-> E3}
|| Encounters := {} || Handles := {Calculus |-> E3,
Controller |-> E3, Params |-> E3}
|| Aborts := {} || ComponentActions := {}
|| Propagates := {}
|| RolesPlayed := {P1 |-> Controller, P2 |-> Calculus,
P3 |-> Params, P1 |-> ControllerChecking,
P2 |-> ParamsChecking}
|| ActionsConsistent := yes
|| ParticipantsConsistent := yes
|| RolesConsistent := yes
OPERATIONS
actionConsistent =
IF !Act.( (Act : ACTION) =>
(ran({Act} <| Internal) = ran(ran({Act} <| Roles) <| Raises)
\/ ran(ran({Act} <| NestedActions) <| External))
& (ran({Act} <| External) = ran(ran({Act} <| Roles)
<| Signals))
& (ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])) <: Resolved[Roles[{Act}]])
& (card({E | E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& (!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))}) > 0 =>
(#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & AE = AbortException(Act)))
)& (card({E | E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& (!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))}) = 0 =>
not(#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & AE = AbortException(Act)))
)
& (#E.(E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}]))
& !R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) => not(E:Handles[{R}]
or E:Aborts[{R}]))
) =>
( (card(Signals[Roles[{Act}]] \/
ran({Act} <| FailException)) > 1 =>
(#FE.(FE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & FE = FailException(Act))))
&
(card(Signals[Roles[{Act}]]
\/ ran({Act} <| FailException)) <= 1 =>
not(#FE.(FE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & FE = FailException(Act))))
)
)
& ((dom(union(Resolution[{Act}])) /\ Excluding[{Act}]) = {})
& (!ES.((ES:POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION) &
(ES:(dom(union(Resolution[{Act}])) \/ Excluding[{Act}]))) =>
card(ES) <=
( card({R|R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]
& card(Raises[{R}] /\ ES) > 0})
+ card({NA|NA:ACTION & NA:NestedActions[{Act}]
& card(External[{NA}] /\ ES) > 0})
)
)
)
)
THEN ActionsConsistent := yes
ELSE ActionsConsistent := no
END;
roleConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) =>
(Encounters[{R}] = External[ComponentActions[{R}]])
& (Resolved[{R}] = ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])))
& ((Handles[{R}] /\ Aborts[{R}]) = {})
& (Aborts[{R}] <: Resolved[{R}])
& (Signals[{R}] = Resolved[{R}] - Handles[{R}]
- ((Resolved[{R}] - Handles[{R}])
/\ dom(union(Propagates[{R}])))
\/ (union(Propagates[{R}]))[(Resolved[{R}]
- Handles[{R}])]
)
& (Raises[{R}] = Encounters[{R}] \/ Generates[{R}])
& (dom(union(Propagates[{R}])) <: Resolved[{R}]
- Handles[{R}])
& (ran(union(Propagates[{R}])) <: Signals[{R}])
& (Handles[{R}] <: Resolved[{R}])
)
)
THEN RolesConsistent := yes
ELSE RolesConsistent := no
END;
participantsConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
(!NA.((NA:ACTION & NA:NestedActions[{Act}]) =>
(!P.((P:PARTICIPANT) => card(RolesPlayed[{P}]
/\ Roles[{Act}]) <= 1))
& (Roles[{Act}] <: RolesPlayed[PARTICIPANT])
& (!NAR.((NAR:ROLE & NAR:Roles[{NA}]) =>
#P.(P:PARTICIPANT & NAR:RolesPlayed[{P}]
& card(RolesPlayed[{P}] /\ Roles[{Act}]) > 0)
)
)
))
)
THEN ParticipantsConsistent := yes
ELSE ParticipantsConsistent := no
END
END;
END
